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SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology; Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie; Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie; Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie; Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology; Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics; J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods; J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie; Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin; Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review; Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale; Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scolastique; Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique; Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie; R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affini; V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie; Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik; Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, I. Abtl.: Zeitschrift für Psychologie.*—Other titles are self-explanatory.]

Du rapport de la philosophie aux sciences. EMILE BOUTROUX. Rev. de Mét., XIX, 4, pp. 418–435.

Up to the time of the Rennaissance, the question of this relation did not exist, as there was no autonomous science; at that time, however, science and philosophy became coördinate mental disciplines. Next, Descartes's theory of the "point of view" destroyed this relation, and science now left no place for philosophy except as a coördinate science or as the knowledge of immediate experience. When philosophy tried to be a distinct science it split up into several sciences, psychology, æsthetics, ethics. On the other hand, when philosophy tried to deal with immediate experience, it discovered that it ceased to be knowledge, for by mere unmediated intuition nothing can be known. So philosophy as the *unity* of *human* experience disappears. Now the human mind seems to be provided with two organs of knowledge; the scientific categories and the reason, so in working from science to justify philosophy, we need not predetermine the result by using solely the scientific ideal of knowledge. On the contrary, science itself requires the use of the reason as it needs a basis of assumptions for its work. Even in mathematics this is true, for here we have to assume the infinite. In life and action too, we have certain postulates which turn out to be the same as those of science; the idea of infinite possibilities of action, of changes qualitative and quantitative, of adaption, combination and duty. So it is possible to see in reason the common root of life and science, which can only be separated by an artificial distinction. Thus philosophy reinstates itself with a method, combined of dialectic and intuition, and a function of seeking the connections of life and science in three ways: (1) Analysis of scientific method, (2) the showing of the relations between reality and the fields of art, morality, and religion, (3) the study of truth and existence. This, however, leaves it difficult to state the exact relation of philosophy and science. Each of them seeks connections, and in the development of thought these vary; philosophy, however, remains as reason realizing itself in science and life. And this connection is in harmony, not perhaps with the definite systems of particular philosophers, but with the general spirit of philosophy in its development.

F. R. PROUT.

Is there One Science of Nature? J. A. THOMSON. Hibbert Jour., X, 1, pp. 110–129.

Though an excellent instrument of research, the mechanistic hypothesis has not been able to formulate the biological facts, Organisms manifest purpose; they tend to respond effectively; they profit by experience. Not a single every-day function such as digestion, respiration, or the irritation of nerves, has as yet received a description in physico-chemical terms. When physical and chemical processes take place in the organism, the living cells make a difference which we cannot explain but have to accept as a fact. Bunge, Haldane, and Driesch show that the processes disclosed by physico-chemical analysis, are means made use of by the organism, but that they do not themselves constitute life. Physical laws do not account for the specific. Organic growth differs from inorganic change in that the organism assimilates, and in that it maintains its specific structure throughout all cell-division. Physico-chemical descriptions of all the activities of all the different parts of the organism would not show the harmonious coördination of the parts nor their capacity for adjustment to changeful external conditions. Adaptation or purposiveness requires a historical explanation; it is a supra-mechanical concept. Similarly, when we pass to animal behavior and observe such facts as the organic preparation of many creatures for one particular but absolutely indispensable stimulus. Furthermore, if we take the various items in a complex process such as that of migration and reduce it hence as far as possible to physical and chemical common denominators, we do not make any clearer the interconnection of all these items into the single act of migration. We must begin with the concept of an organism, a specific individuality, an historical being, a being which contains within itself the history, not merely of its own existence, but of all its ancestors. The necessities of biological method thus prevent the possibility of there being erected a single science of nature on a physico-chemical basis.

J. R. TUTTLE.

Le Pragmatisme et le Réalisme du sens commun. L. DAURIAC. Rev. Ph., XXXVI, 10, pp. 337–368.

The attitude of Pragmatism is much older than the specific doctrine by that name. It finds expression, for example, in the common-sense school, in the Scottish school, in the Empiricism represented by Thomas Reid, and in Positivism. The realism of Pragmatism is the simple affirmation of common sense that the existence of the world is immediately known through the senses. The test of amount of existence in a given object is for Pragmatism, as for common sense, amount of resistance. That man most exists who is most to be reckoned with, and that object most exists whose presence is most an obstacle to our free movements. Resistance is also the test by which we distinguish our waking from our dream life. Because Idealism deals with a knowledge of ideas instead of with a knowledge of things in their essential nature of resisting bodies, it may be called a philosophy of dream. Thomas Reid affirmed the power of the mind to know reality, but he inconsistently clung to the notion of an underlying substance. He should have seen that the primary quality of resistance is the substance, and that the secondary qualities are modes in which resistance manifests itself. The empiricism of Pragmatism is best designated as a philosophy of experience, for it must be distinguished from the traditional empiricism as well as from the traditional rationalism. Philosophers of both of these traditional types sought to reduce the internal life to a mechanical play of simple elements, but the Pragmatist simply observes the facts of knowledge. His philosophy grows gradually according to the exigencies of action. What had been merely psychology becomes, in Pragmatism, a philosophy.

KATHERINE EVERETT.

Brief Studies in Realism. JOHN DEWEY. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., VII, 15, pp. 393-400; 20, pp. 546-554.

Such cases as seen light, doubled imagery, etc., suggest the problem of the many in one, *i. e.*, the problem of the maintenance of a continuity of process throughout differences. For naïve realism, such 'perceptions' are natural events; for presentative realism, they have an inherent cognitive status, they are cases of knowledge. The latter view leaves the way open to the idealistic interpretation. But in many cases the 'real object' does not become known by perception but by a logical process, by inference; hence logical assertions are cases of knowledge, and are more valid than knowledge by perception. With relation to the inferential knowledge, perceptions as natural events occupy a unique status. (1) They are the sole ultimate data or media of inference to all natural objects and processes, and as data acquire a knowledge status. The value of knowing thus depends upon perception. (2) For practical purposes, many perceptions become through habit cases of knowledge. For this naïve realism the 'problem of knowledge' becomes: Control of the conditions of inference so as to guide it toward the better. The second paper deals with the result of making perception a case of knowing. This result is the absolute ubiquity of the knowledge relation, and the inevitableness of epistemology. Supposing the ubiquity of the relation, realism and idealism exhaust the alternatives; if the relationship is a myth both doctrines are unreal. If the knowledge relation of things to a self is the exhaustive relation, idealism and realism have a common premise. We may disregard the relation as a mere attendant circumstance of discussion, thus leaving the issue one of subject-matter. The relation of knower to known is not an intelligible question if the knowledge relation is ubiquitous, as is evidenced by the interminable controversy between the idealist and the realist. The idealistic assertion rests upon the presupposition of the ubiquity of the knowledge relation, and has force only against the epistemological realist. The whole question of the relation of knower to known is misconceived in epistemology because of an unexamined assumption, one which, when examined, makes the controversy absurd. There are relations other than the knower-known, which as matter of fact are capable of matter-of-fact inquiry. For the pragmatic realists, knowing is something that happens to things in the natural course of their career, and, in this natural continuity, things in becoming known undergo a qualitative change. The problem of the relation of existence in the way of knowing to other existences or events is a natural problem to be attacked by natural methods.

E. JORDAN.

Neovitalism. VICTOR WEIZSÄCKER. Logos, II, 1, pp. 113–124.

Vitalism is the theory that maintains that life did not arise out of the Mechanism of Nature; and that it requires a special principle of explanation. Driesch, a modern representative of the vitalists, calls that factor Entelechy, a term adopted from Aristotle. The Entelechy is not a form of energy or mechanical force. It has definite relations to material phenomena. It works in harmony with certain material laws and in apparent opposition to others. But the Entelechy is subject to law. Life can be explained either mechanically or by a special principle. If the former is impossible the existence of the latter follows, though its exact nature need not be known in order to prove vitalism. Driesch has shown the impossibility of mechanistic explanation for organic life. The incorrect use of material and ideal concepts is what caused difficulties in reference to vitalism. Organic life is a concept involving both in a single unity. The opposition between Vitalism and Mechanism may be compared with that between teleology and mechanism, with the same Kantian refutation of Mechanism. Biology looks at its phenomena from the standpoint of purpose as if biological phenomena showed the implication of an idea, but it may make use of Mechanism as one of the means of securing an understanding of the organism.

HENRY MAYER.

Le catégorie de relation. A. CHIDE. Rev. Ph., XXXVI, 9, pp. 358–377.

To institute a relation between things is the chief work of the mind. According to rationalism the mind discovers a relation between the elements offered it by experience. According to empiricism the mind is passive, and receives from outside simply the reflection of things, so that all relation is the result of coexistence, whether in us or outside of us. Relation or system (*ratio*) takes the forms of analysis and synthesis. Analysis, by induction and deduction, infers the existence of concepts not only in our thought but outside of it in the cosmos. Synthesis arrives at cosmic relations by an *a priori* construction. From Heraclitus to Hegel the genesis of categories has been metaphysical and dialectical. Relation was the initial category from which all the others were deduced. Opposed to this, empiricism maintains that the chain of categories is not a matter of logic, that they do not constitute a system but a disparate grouping, and that they are only so many psychological facts, posited by experience. Consciousness appeared originally by necessity. In rudimentary organisms mechanical reflexes took its place. As the organism became more complex the response to excitation was less automatic. Indecision manifested itself. Problems arose. The problem engendered the thought that was to solve it. At first it was a phosphorescence vaguely illuminating the data; gradually it fitted the response to the excitation, until the response was registered in the organism, so that it finally appeared with the same surety as the reflex. The pragmatic character of the origin of thought is indisputably attested. To extend the history of this evolution, to show how gradually the categories that eventually constitute intelligence have been established, would be to make over Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind*, but it would be from the pragmatic point of view, not from the dialectic.

ALMA R. THORNE.

De l'objet réel de métaphysique. H. DE KEYSERLING. Rev. de Mét., XIX, 4, pp. 467–479.

Up to the present time, we have not completely defined reality in an unanimous way; but we have at least cleared the ground by doing away with the confusion of being and thought shown in Plato's abstract universal, by distinguishing, as did Kant, between objective and subjective reality, and by showing that the intelligible need not be real. Now, in the examination of phenomenal reality we can find one unique entity which surpasses the limits of pure reason in three ways; and this entity is life. (1) Life has a capacity of creation; there is more in the effect than in the cause. (2) Life has an over-individual character; the bodily life is but a transition from ancestor to descendant. (3) Life goes beyond immediate experience; it forms the bond between the child, the mature man, and the dotard. Life then seems to be the true metaphysical reality, and this is, in fact, the subject of the thought of the most profound thinkers of all time. If it be objected that this identifies metaphysics with biology and that the traditional metaphysics had as its object something different, the answer is that such a metaphysics is unreal, as there is no other possible object for it; and that biology itself recognizes the transcendent nature of life but can not deal with it. This point of view may be applied to the questions of ethics and æsthetics; then the good and the beautiful become, not transcendent nor derived from experience, but true characteristics of life itself.

F. R. PROUT.

Creative Evolution and Philosophic Doubt. A. J. BALFOUR. Hibbert Jour., X, 1, pp. 1–23.

Freedom is the very corner-stone of Bergson's system. Life is free, spontaneous, and incalculable. Matter modifies the course of the stream of life, but does not make it flow. All plant and animal life proceeds from superconsciousness, above and beyond matter, and no life quite loses its original freedom and spontaneity. Bergson denies that life, will, or consciousness are mere functions of the material organism, holding, on the contrary, that they make use of it, releasing at will in a quasi-explosive manner the energy which the organism has obtained from the sun, directly in the case of plants, indirectly in the case of animals. Balfour holds that the manner rather than the fact of this release should have been emphasized, since the latter is not distinguishable from the mechanism of the inorganic world. In fact, Bergson does regard the element of contingency in living organisms both as a consequence and as a sign of the effort on the part of creative will to reduce mechanism to the control of freedom. Consciousness in general is the *prius* of all that exists, whether physical or mental. This *prius* is not an absolute of which time is a mere aspect, but the absolute is almost resolved into time. While time is of the essence of the primordial activity, matter is but a by-product of the evolutionary process, and space, as its limiting term, is of decidedly subordinate importance. Among the general criticisms which he raises, Balfour asks how, if creative evolution be essentially planless and contingent, can Bergson give such a confident account of the process after it has occurred. Again, on the side of the theory of knowledge, if instinct is the true guide to the apprehension of free reality, why should ants and bees, whose freedom is so limited, have such strong instincts, and why should man, the freest being, especially pursue reason, the function of which is to deal with matter and necessity. Balfour maintains that Bergson makes an unwarranted use of the conception of the super-conscious, and that he frequently brings in metaphysical hypotheses to fill up particular gaps in scientific explanations. The strongest elements in Bergson's system are held to be the rejection of naturalism with its mechanistic explanation of knowledge, and the recognition of values, such as freedom, creative will, the joy of creation, etc. But though consciousness has replaced matter and mechanism in the system, values are not carried far enough, for if consciousness, freedom, and will have no other purpose than their own self-augmentation, the haphazard character of the result is far from satisfying.

J. R. TUTTLE.

Vie végétative et vie intellectuelle. F. LE DANTEC. Rev. Ph., XXXVI, 9, pp. 225–257.

In order to define life it is necessary to find some function that is common to animals and vegetables, and to them alone. An organism in which assimilation appears may be called a living organism. A body cannot assimilate aliments from another unless the latter contains the constituent atoms of the assimilating body. If the assimilation were perfect, there would be left no trace of the nature of the aliments in the body nourished by them, but this rarely happens in nature, because of the coexistence of destructive phenomena in the *milieu*. When the activity of the assimilating body includes an assimilation of the destructive elements there is said to be a *functional* assimilation. The victorious organism is afterward more or less immune from the destructive influence. This law of assimilation is verified in pathology, and is used in the production of anti-toxins. Traces of the struggle are left in the structure of the organism, and may be transmitted, if they are acquired in the same manner during several generations. Among the acquired characteristics that may be transmitted must be mentioned the instincts and the 'logic' that synthesizes everything. Vegetation also has its 'logic,' and uses it as we use ours. The idea of intelligence cannot be separated from the idea of life. The part of ancestral experience that is transmitted is the part which has been necessary to preserve life. When the young of the species are educated by their parents, some parts of ancestral experience are handed down by tradition, and acquired by imitation. Imitation may be defined as the revenge of the *milieu* upon the living organism, for it betrays the inability of the latter to assimilate all the necessary elements of the *milieu*. Imitation takes place when we hear a sound, or when our digestive system struggles with a toxin. In both cases we may say that a rhythmic activity is set up, and by means of a functional assimilation, a new structural organ is created having the properties of the exterior rhythm. The imitative organs, being gradually fixed in our heredity (as acquired characteristics), make possible the rapid education of the young. It is all a matter of functional assimilation. What we call imperfections, are the souvenirs of an absolute assimilation, and what we designate as our superior faculties, are the failures in our assimilation. That is to say, our ancestral 'logic,' the resumé of our ancestral experience, is composed of souvenirs from a partial assimilation of the *milieu*, and if there is any distinction here between *βίος* and *ζωή*, it lies in the more complete assimilation of the *milieu* by the latter.

ALMA R. THORNE.

Méthode de la science pédagogique. L. CELLÉRIER. Rev. Ph., XXXVI, 10, pp. 400–422.

The facts of education, although now mere isolated observations, are susceptible of scientific treatment. Such a treatment would generalize and systematize to the extent which the facts warrant, but would never pass over into *a priori* constructions. In conformity to this principle, education may be defined as the preparation of the child to realize an ideal, the content of which is determined by the particular conditions of his life. The data of education are: the pupil, who is at once a child and a future man; the educator, who is a real person and not an ideal being; and the medium in which the child must develop and to which he must be adapted. All facts which deal with the control of action by reason are subject-matter for pedagogy. These facts should fall into one of two general classes: (1) they may be centrifugal, that is, they may relate to the training of the child's mind and character for expression in a certain ideal; (2) they may be centripetal, that is, they may relate to the acquisition of elements of knowledge and reasoning. While this classification presents abstractions, it abstracts from real facts, and is therefore relevant to actual educational processes.

KATHERINE EVERETT.

Les tendances actuelles de la psychologie anglaise. G. CANTECOR. Rev. Ph., XXXVI, 10, pp. 368–400.

The present tendencies of English psychology may be gathered from the works of three representative psychologists, Messrs. Sully, Ward, and Stout. Mr. Sully's work exhibits a thorough working out of detail and penetrative analysis, but lacks fundamental theories and principles. He is not systematic. Mr. Ward is more systematic in that he tries to define the nature and limits of his science. Psychology deals, not with subjective facts, but with the real world from its own point of view. It is the most concrete of sciences in that it shows how subject and objects, by interaction, produce and constitute a real world. The process of experience is the infinite repetition of a certain cycle of mental operations; the action of the object upon the subject who then directs his attention to the object, the accentuating of certain elements in the subject's reaction by a pleasant or painful feeling, and the resulting transformation of the object. Mr. Ward's explanation of the method of organizing experience is a modification of Kant in that, for Mr. Ward, the categories are not given, but arise in response to the exigencies of concrete life. Mr. Stout discovers by analysis three elementary mental forms or reactions,—thought, feeling, and action. These, however, he finally reduces to a single, absolutely simple type, the matter of thought in the form of action. But Mr. Ward gives no adequate explanation of mental action or the order of its development. What is common doctrine to these three psychologists is, in certain respects, in agreement with, and in certain respects, a departure from, the traditional English empiricism. With tradition, they preserve the static and independent character of psychology as over against the dynamic and genetic tendencies of Spencer, and the physiological tendency of Maudsley. But on three points they break away from tradition. (1) They define mental processes as vital functions rather than as a mechanical interplay of ideas. (2) They reject psychological atomism, and present consciousness as a continuum, and interpret relations as constitutive of the nature of presentations. (3) Organization and invention of mental material are substituted for automatic combination. The general emphasis among them all is upon attention or the reaction of the subject as the essential factor in mental development. Thus mental life is described as a true synthesis.

KATHERINE EVERETT.

Life and Consciousness. HENRI BERGSON. Hibbert Jour., X, 1, pp. 24–44.

Viewed from one angle, the function of consciousness is to retain the past and anticipate the future; from another, its function is to express the amount of choice at the disposal of the organism. Consciousness is most probably present in all living matter, dormant or atrophied where its original spontaneity is lost, but becoming more intense, complex, and complete where living matter tends toward activity and movement. While inert matter is subject to rigid necessity, living beings become reservoirs of indeterminism, choice, consciousness. That which unites these realms of fatality and liberty is life, which is nothing but consciousness using matter for its purposes. This appears in two ways. On the side of movement, consciousness sets free in an explosive flash energy drawn from matter through great periods of time and directs this energy through choice. On the side of sensation, consciousness, by an effort of concentration, grasps innumerable events and enables us to control them. In the diverse lines which the evolutionary consciousness takes in its effort to subdue matter, it is only with difficulty that the creative force escapes being ensnared in automatization. Man alone can oppose every contracted habit by another habit and through this struggle achieve liberty. The creative force or vital impulse ever seeks to transcend itself and extract from itself more than is there—that is, to create. Matter does not merely oppose the struggle for freedom and higher consciousness, but helps to separate and distinguish elements that were formerly confused. It further serves to provoke effort, which, though painful, is more precious to us than the finished work in which it results. The sign of successful effort is the joy of creative activity.

J. R. TUTTLE.

Die Psychologischen Grundlagen der Kantschen Erkenntnistheorie. JOSEF REINHOLD. Ar. f. sys. Ph., XVII, 2, pp. 183–242.

The first and most important presupposition of epistemology in general, and of the Kantian in particular, is the distinction between subject and object. This distinction, as Herbart has correctly shown, is of a purely psychological character; and, since epistemology rests upon this distinction, and sets itself the task of explaining subjective phenomena in their relation to external objects, it is put, necessarily, upon a psychological basis. Kant admits this in the *Anthropology*, but the admission stands in direct opposition to his claim that epistemology, as an *a priori* science, is in no way grounded in empirical-psychological cognition. The position taken in the *Anthropology*, however, is sustained by the characterization of the concepts 'Understanding' and 'Sensibility' in the first *Critique*. This in no way transcends the limits of a psychological description, and is in perfect agreement with what is said about these functions of cognition in Kant's psychological works. Moreover, the distinction between synthetic and analytic judgments, due, in turn, to the distinction between thought faculty and sense faculty, is of a psychological nature. The latter distinction, again, furnishes the basis for the concept of the *a priori*, which is derived from the principle of contradiction, in so far as this is the principle of analytic judgments, and which can have ascribed to it only a psychological reality. Kant also attempted to base the apodictic certainty of the synthetic judgment upon the concept of the *a priori*, but the attempt was no new one. It was the fundamental thought of all the idealistic-dogmatic philosophical systems from Plato to Leibniz. For the latter, *a priori* meant innateness only, and was limited to the understanding, while Kant attempted to explain the validity of the concept for objective reality. Hence, the synthetic judgment also must be said to depend upon psychology. But, in addition to the logical use of the *a priori*, Kant insisted on applying the concept to the forms of the sensibility. The transition from the former to the latter is effected by the distinction between outer and inner sense, and, since Kant took this, along with his whole doctrine of sensation, from Locke, proof for its psychological character is superfluous. The distinction, however, involved Kant, not only in psychological, but also in insoluble epistemological difficulties: (1) In what way can the ideas furnished by external objects be experienced as inner states of consciousness? (2) What is the relation of the appearance of the object in *inner sense* to the object as it really is? Hence, the assumption of a *sensible a priori* must be regarded as a psychological theory. The procedure by which this is established runs through three stages: (1) We must penetrate into the psychological nature of the cognition, the apodictic certainty of which is to be explained. (2) It must be shown that the assumption of a sensible *a priori* offers first a general explanation, and then, that it offers the only possible explanation. (3) It must be made clear in what way the sensible *a priori* can be included in the structure of the act of cognition in a psychical process. Kant asserted that the principles which underlie the transcendental deduction of the categories are universality and necessity. But the validity of the former in this respect is established only by the latter, and thus the two may be reduced to one—necessity—which turns out, upon examination, to be the expresison of a psychological law. If it be objected that this princple would not explain the number of the categories which Kant adopted, it may be replied that the principle of the possibility of the deduction of *a priori* concepts from the table of judgments in no way invalidates the criterion of necessity, nor rules it out as a methodological principle. United with Kant's doctrine of the judgment, it forms the broad psychological basis of that procedure which led him to establish the complete table of the categories. The psychological analysis, which thus stands at the basis of the categories as principles for epistemology, furnishes also the ground of their objectivity. Epistemology as an independent science has quite different problems from psychology, but it is no "pollution of science" to apply to the method of epistemology the fruits of psychological investigation.

MARK E. PENNEY.

Imageless Thought. JAMES R. ANGELL. Psych. Rev., XVIII, 5, pp. 295–323.

Professor Angell takes the position that in the controversy over the doctrine of imageless thought the burden of proof lies on the upholders of the doctrine and that they have not as yet established their case. The following are the main points on which he finds the doctrine "open to suspicion." (1) The method of its experimental investigation is at least not wholly satisfactory in meeting the demands of ordinary experimental procedure. This is true, both as regards the problem of reflective consciousness, and that of voluntary muscular control. (2) Imageless thought seems with many observers to be a sporadic and occasional phenomenon. Its appearance is not in their cases invariably connected with any special kind of situation. (3) Unless the purely functional and logical terms be used it seems almost impossible to describe it, save in negative terms. (4) There are many well-recognized conscious states which may obviously be readily confused with imageless thought. This suggests either that the analysis is not yet complete, or that the thing analyzed is not really a content of consciousness.

JAMES S. JOHNSTON.

The Elements of Experience and Their Integration: or Modalism. HENRY J. WATT. Br. J. Ps., IV, 2, pp. 128–204.

For the progress of psychology its independence must be secured. The first step along this line must be the freeing of the province of sensation from the domination of physiology. A comprehensive science of psychophysics can be built up better by the independent development of physiology and psychology than by "their narrow companionship." Psychology in the past has been content to show "upon what conditions our complex experiences and their modifications rested," and has not attempted to "show how the elements of our experience combined to give complex experiences." As a method, introspection is insufficient to meet all cases; another method must be devised by which the properties of the elements of experience can be determined. "We must follow the example of the sister sciences of nature and converge the efforts of all pure mental science upon the problems of the constitution of experience and its fundamental laws," and it is in terms of these problems that the author gives an account of certain phases of experience. The author deals with the typical characteristics of sensation, the measurement of experience, secondary modifications of experience, feeling, and recognition. He summarizes the result of his treatment as the probability "that sensations are the only elements of experience and that all apparently different states of mind are modifications which result from the integration of these sensations in relation to some common attribute." However it is the method of his treatment rather than his results to which Mr. Watt would call attention.

JAMES S. JOHNSTON.

The System of Habits and the System of Ideas. ROBERT MACDOUGALL. Psych. Rev., XVIII, 5, pp. 324–335.

The two constituents of mental development, the general character of which may be described as adaptation, are systems of ideas and systems of habits. The relation of these two factors may be stated thus: "The system of habits gives to ideal activity its point of origin and its direction; the system of ideas gives to habit a telic value, and maintains its commensurability with an enlarging environment. Without habit experience would be an irrational chaos; without ideas it would have no existence."

JAMES S. JOHNSTON.

The Relation of the Moral Ideal to Reality. FELIX ADLER. Int. J. E., XXII, 1, pp. 1–18.

In an article in the *International Journal of Ethics* for July, 1910, the moral ideal is characterized by the writer as a parity of the elements of plurality and unity. The problem now concerns the relation of this ideal to reality. 'Moral ideal' and 'rational ideal' are synonymous, comprehending an organic, inclusive totality; embracing, in idea, all that is, and possibly can be. It arises in the field of ethics, in response to ethical demands, and is directed, primarily, to the satisfaction of ethical needs, but is not, on that account, dissociated from the work and operation of the reason in other fields. The organic nature of the ideal is constituted by mutual indispensableness, or mutual sustenance of its members, in the sense of reciprocal dependence. Each member is dependent on all the others, as they on it, *with a view to the completing of the totality.* It is thus a spiritual idea, which originates in the rational ideal, and is found only in a perfect, infinite universe. How can this idea be squared with reality? It validates the notion of *worth* to be ascribed to every man. This is a very different conception from that of value. The latter is relative to the satisfaction rendered by one individual to the needs of another. The former is absolute. Hence the rule: So act as to evoke in the other the efficient idea of himself as a member of the infinite organism, and thereby corroborate in thyself the same efficient idea with respect to thyself. The distinctions of egoism and altruism are transcended, and new theories of marriage, of social reform, and of the state emerge. The purpose of these various institutions should be to enhance individual worth by developing personality as a constituent of the organic ideal. Thus, the ideal itself is reality, as furnishing the basis of organization, the conception of worth, and the motor force for the development of distinctive personality.

MARK E. PENNEY.

Jugements de valeur et jugements de réalité. E. DURKHEIM. Rev. de Mét., XIX, 4, pp. 437-453.

When we make statements that strive to express given facts or connections between given facts, we form judgments of reality; but when we attribute to things an *objective* character which expresses the connection of the thing with a *subject*, we form judgments of value. The question then is to make clear the objectivity of the latter class and the difference between the two. One attitude is that the difference is only apparent; values depend on the relation to the self-preservation of the subject. But this subject, if individual, will not sufice to explain the unity of opinion about values, the common acknowledgment of them. If the subject be stated as a *mean type*, the values become lower than the highest possibilities of human nature; they are mediocre. If we state society as the subject, we overturn all our ideas of what is valuable, for our highest values are the most useless for preservation. These ideas hold that the values are in the things; we may then, perhaps, overcome the difficulty by removing the value to a world beyond, which shall transcend the given experience. We have then a world of realities and a world of ideals absolutely distinct from each other; but this separation removes the possibility of any explanation of the ideal. In addition to this the ideals should be permanent and eternal, but we find in experience that they differ very greatly for different times and peoples, and this is especially true of economic values which, in addition, lose all their life if taken from the field of experience. Now if we consider ideals in their origin, we see that they seem to arise as a social product in times of great social feeling and unity. May we not then say that values have their origin in the social whole at times when its possibilities surpass those of any individual member of society? At such times, ideals arise as facts in the immediately given and the judgment of value has as its object in reality, these ideals. So the faculty of judgment is not divided into two different functions, for the judgment of reality acts upon concepts and these may be looked upon as forms of the ideal; so ultimately all judgments become value judgments. Thus we can see that sociology, instead of being an unidealistic science, has as its subject, ideals themselves, and can be of great service in the solution of philosophical problems.

F. R. PROUT.

Pragmatisme et esthétique. J. PÉRÈS. Rev. Ph., XXXVI, 9, pp. 278–284.

The doctrines of pragmatism have as their conception of truth a *lived* truth. Experience, in the pragmatic sense, is a *lived* experience, and would require, outside of the fusion of the 'ego' and the 'non-ego,' a continuity from the standpoint of duration, in which the distinct states of consciousness would constitute rather a reflection upon thought than thought itself. Such a doctrine is in perfect harmony with the tendencies of art. Literary art is most in harmony with pragmatic psychology. Psychology is, in effect, the truth in literature as color is in painting. The true theme of the novel is not so much an arrangement of pathetic incidents, nor even a portrayal of society, as it is life itself. With artistic romancers the written work is only a mosaic of states of mind. This is less true of the plastic arts, and is more true of former painters than of modern ones.

ALMA R. THORNE.

Der Begriff und die Tragödie der Kultur. GEORG SIMMEL. Logos, II, 1, pp. 1–25.

Man, unlike other creatures, is not a mere objective plaything of nature. He also has a subjective, inquiring, active and reacting side; and in this is involved the endless process of the great dualism of subject and object. Within consciousness itself man finds his second problem. Consciousness presents to him fixed creations of the mind, in the form of institutions, custom, science, religion, etc., whose relatively permanent objectivity opposes itself to the changing and developing subjective mind. This opposition is the cause of countless tragedies. The concept of culture is to be found within this dualism having a real existence, but difficult of definition. In the rough, the concept of culture may be defined as "the way of the soul to itself," or more clearly, as "the way of the soul through a many-sided development to a developed unity within itself." Culture involves the utilization of the objective creations of the mind. There is a constant antagonism between the creating process of the subjective mind and its objective creations. Indeed, it often seems as though the creating mind passes away after giving birth to its objective products. The cultural process is a double one. On the one hand, it consists in objectifying the subjective soul, *i. e.*, in giving it expression in art, literature, etc., and on the other hand, in subjectivizing objective phenomena, *i. e.*, in humanizing nature, institutions, etc. A beautiful sunset has no cultural value unless interpreted through human eyes. There are no cultural values as values in themselves; they are at the same time both subjective and objective. Empty refinements of an over-ripe civilization are not culture. On the other hand, over-specialization lacks cultural value for it does not minister to a complete personality. The various elements of life unite in the cultural ideal and are of value only in so far as they are motivated by this ideal. The great tragedy of culture is that in the process of developing to its ideal, the soul is constantly carried away on a tangent to its path of development by the weight of its own objective creations.

HENRY MAYER.